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Abstract 
No question encountered in the social sciences can be answered without appeal to some 
notion of the relative importance of structure versus agency.  International relations (IR) 
appears to be entering an era of shifting global power as the world waits to see how Donald 
Trump’s ‘America first’ agenda plays out.  Will the structure of the international system 
constrain Trump as a change agent?  Or will the Trump administration’s agency lead to 
wrenching changes that threaten both the liberal international order and transatlantic 
alliance?  This paper resorts to debates about structure v. agency in IR to argue that 
crossroads have been reached at 3 levels:  the international system, transatlantic relations, 
and democratic politics.  All are linked to one another in terms of outcomes, but it is 
perhaps the domestic level – where the negative externalities of globalization must be 
confronted – where changes are needed most urgently. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 I am grateful to the editors and 3 anonymous reviewers for useful feedback, as well as to attendees at 
seminars where earlier drafts were presented at the University of Warwick, the Georgia Institute of 
Technology and the University of California (Berkeley).   
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No question encountered in the social sciences can be answered – if the answer involves an 
argument about causality – without appeal to some idea of the relative importance of 
structure versus agency.  As Hay (1995: 189) suggests, all causal explanations assume, 
implicitly or explicitly, how relatively autonomous agents (or ‘actors’) are to make choices 
about how they act, as well as how constrained they are by the wider setting in which they 
find themselves:  ‘Are the effects we wish to explain the products of actors displaying their 
agency, making unconstrained choices; or are these effects the products of the unfolding logic 
of a structure (or set of structures) over which agents (individual or collective) have no 
control’?   
Most debates about international relations (IR) boil down to differing views about 
whether outcomes result more from the agency of states or the structure of the international 
system.  The structure that emerged and cohered after the end of the Second World War was 
variously termed the ‘liberal’ or ‘western’ international order, depending upon one’s wider 
theoretical perspective.  The durability of that order, as well as of the transatlantic alliance 
between the United States (US) and Europe, has been called into question as never before by 
multiple crises besetting the European Union (EU) and the election of Donald Trump as US 
President.  If all of this were not enough, it coincides with tension (at best) and disjuncture 
(at worst) between rising multipolarity and established multilateralism.   
This article offers a theoretically-framed assessment of the prospects for both the 
transatlantic alliance and post-war international order in the Trump era.  Both the US and EU 
face choices about whether to prioritise new alliances.  However, their options may be 
constrained by sunk costs invested in deep transatlantic policy cooperation on issues 
including counterterrorism, financial markets regulation, and military strategy within NATO.  
The question is whether the transatlantic alliance is structural in the sense of being resilient 
even in the face of wider, global power shifts and the rise to power of change agents such as 
Trump.  This article offers a broad investigation of whether agency trumps structure, or vice 
versa, in the transatlantic alliance and broader international order of the early 21st century.  
However, it does not limit itself – as much IR theory does – to locating causation exclusively 
at the level of the international system of states.  Rather, its analysis extends to multiple levels 
including American and European civil society and voters.  
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Section 1 below interrogates the role of structure and agency in competing theoretical 
accounts of IR.  Section 2 examines the extent to which multiple, established structures – 
internationally and domestically – are likely to limit the Trump administration’s choices as it 
seeks to realise its ‘America first’ agenda.  In section 3, we shift to Europe and assess its 
capacity to defend multilateralism and the liberal international order despite the rise of 
Trump.  Section 4 zeroes in on the transatlantic alliance itself.  It seeks to judge how much the 
established habits and institutions of US-European cooperation can be expected to weather 
multiple shocks including the election of Trump and ‘Brexit’:  the United Kingdom’s (UK) 
decision to leave the EU.  A conclusion summarises the article’s central argument. Put simply, 
it is that recent evidence suggesting that liberal internationalism no longer pays domestically 
in democratic politics means the futures of the liberal order, transatlantic alliance and 
western democratic politics are inextricably bound together.  Defenders of all three need to 
develop new and convincing narratives about their benefits, as well as about the affinities 
that bind together democracies. 
 
1. Structure and Agency in IR Theory 
Structural logic has long dominated IR theory, particularly - for obvious reasons - during the 
Cold War.  From the end of the Second World War until the early 1990s, the balance of power 
in IR was a (more or less) bipolar one, with most states hitching their wagon – voluntarily or 
not – to a US or Soviet-led alliance.  Despite the emergence, especially amongst former 
colonies, of a ‘non-aligned’ movement of states, what mattered most were ebbs and flows of 
power between the superpowers.   
In these circumstances, realists of all stripes theorised that states are egoistic and 
power-maximizing entities.  Cold War competition yielded an insecure international system 
in which anarchy prevailed, with no overarching authority higher than states to ensure order.  
An edgy stability prevailed only because most states aligned with either the US or Soviet 
Union.  The scope for agency or choice was strictly limited. 
At one of the heights of Cold War tension, an impressively parsimonious version of 
realism was borne.  Kenneth Waltz, the father of neo-realism, came to be viewed - and much-
criticised - as a structural determinist.  His Theory of International Politics (note its simple yet 
audacious title) argued that ‘[i]n defining international-political structures we take states with 
whatever traditions, habits, objectives, desires, and forms of government they may have…We 
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abstract from every attribute of states except their capabilities’ (Waltz 1979: 99).  In other 
words, neo-realism theorised exclusively based on the distribution of capabilities between 
agents – states – in the structure of the international system.  Agency mattered and states 
certainly acted, especially to enhance their capabilities and, therefore, their power.  But 
structure trumped agency in terms of causation.  The international system of states ‘work[ed] 
to keep outcomes within narrow ranges’ (Waltz 1979: 73).  As Rengger (2007: 120-1) neatly 
summarizes:  ‘[i]t is the structure of the international system that causes states (and, thus the 
individuals who act for states) to act in the manner that they do’.2 
 The leading alternative to realism has long been liberal IR theory, as developed by 
John Ikenberry (2001; 2017), Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (Keohane and Nye 2011; Nye 
2015), amongst others.  Even before the Cold War ended, they contended that the liberal 
post-war international order – with the transatlantic alliance at its core – had institutionalised 
mostly stable and cooperative relations between states.  Before but especially after the Cold 
War ended, that order was buttressed by international institutions and law that restrained 
states from engaging in behaviour that violated progressively stronger international norms 
(Ikenberry 2001).  The argument was (and is) that the liberal international order both 
constrained states and was durable.    
Liberal IR theorists thus did not really challenge, let alone reject, the structural 
determinism of neo-realism.  As one leading liberal theorist put it, all IR theories are ‘systemic 
theories in a Waltzian sense’ (Moravcsik 2003: 7).  That is, all theorise on the basis of the 
distribution of power between states, thus privileging structure over agency. 
Meanwhile, constructivist IR theorists and foreign policy analysts showed how choices 
made by political leaders can not only determine international outcomes but reshape the 
structural conditions faced by future policy-makers.  Wendt (1992) – a leading constructivist 
– insisted that anarchy ‘is what states make of it’.  That is, states have no choice but to 
interact, negotiate, and seek to understand each other to construct (socially) the international 
system. Thus, their agency matters in determining norms, rules and habits that govern the 
structure in which they operate.  Simply put, constructivists view structure and agency as 
mutually constitutive, not least because agents perceive that – and more particularly how – 
their choices can alter structures.   
                                                          
2 Emphasis in original. 
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Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), for its part, focuses on foreign policy decision-making 
and what determines choices that policy makers make (see Smith et al 2012).  The structure 
of the international system certainly matters.  But it matters – in theoretical terms – insofar 
as how it is perceived in the minds of those who make foreign policy.  FPA makes few prior 
assumptions about how actors’ perceptions of the structural distribution of power between 
states constrain their choices.  The focus is firmly on those actors and their agency.  In contrast 
with most IR theory, there is no supposition in FPA scholarship that structure trumps agency 
(see Carlsnaes 1992).   
At a time of unprecedented doubt about the resilience of the international system, 
debates about whether we should look more to agents or structure to describe, explain and 
predict IR matter more than ever.  Such debates are by no means purely theoretical.  To 
simplify only a little, contestation boils down to disputes about the extent to which we will 
witness more change or continuity on two cardinal questions.  One is how much power has 
shifted between agents in IR.  Even before Brexit or Trump’s election, a considerable body of 
work was underway investigating how and how much superior rates of economic growth 
amongst emerging states constituted a ‘global power shift’ away from the West (see Alcaro 
2016).  One such contribution portrayed a ‘World in Disarray’:  ‘[i]t is difficult not to take 
seriously the possibility that one historical era is ending and another beginning’ (Haas 2017: 
xii).  A ‘new world disorder’ arises from how ‘[p]ower is more distributed in more hands that 
at any time in history’ (Haas 2017: 5, 11).  This claim obviously is as much or more about how 
power has shifted away from states than between them.  But few claim that the West retains 
its traditional post-war position of dominance in IR. 
A separate dispute concerns whether an international order mostly constructed by 
the West is both robust and malleable enough to contain power shifts power peacefully.  It is 
tempting to conclude that when emerging powers pursue their interests assertively – as 
Russia in Crimea or China in the South China Sea – it is on the basis of their calculation that 
the international order (from which emerging states mostly benefit) is resilient enough to 
bend without breaking.  But even if they are right, two grave dangers arise.  One is 
miscalculations:  intentions may be misread, red lines drawn that cannot be rescinded, and 
powerful states can stumble into conflict unintentionally.  A second danger is that America’s 
interlocutors focus overmuch on Trump and his eccentricities without paying sufficient 
attention to deficiencies in the international order that require repair.  By many accounts, 
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dark and dangerous days have arrived in IR.  Assessing whether they will persist or eventually 
lift starts by considering whether structure outplays agency in causal terms, or vice versa. 
 
2.  Agency, Structure and Trump 
One of the great observers of the idea of power – Harold Lasswell (1950: 214) – observed that 
‘[t]he vocabulary of American public life’ is different than it is in other democracies:  
specifically, it is ‘legal, ethical and theological rather than analytical; and where it is analytical, 
it is personal and partisan rather than impersonal’.  In the decade that followed, Richard 
Hofstadter delivered a lecture at Oxford University that was the genesis for his idiosyncratic 
classic The Paranoid Style in American Politics.  In it, Hofstadter sought to make sense of the 
rise of the far right in US politics following McCarthyism and foreshadowing Barry Goldwater.  
Hofstadter (2008: 44) noted that its proponents claimed to be ‘conservatives’ to enhance 
their respectability but were in practice consumed with a ‘profound if largely unconscious 
hatred of our society and our ways’. 
 Both books earned their status as masterworks in the Trump era.  The investigation of 
the Trump campaign’s ties to Russia by former FBI Director Robert Mueller consumed 
Washington during his administration’s first two years.  Debate and speculation about its 
endgame was legal, ethical and theological in equal measure according to Lasswell’s formula.  
It was also, of course, intensely personal and partisan, as was nearly everything about Trump’s 
White House.   
 Trump’s astonishingly rapid political rise found a launch pad in popular alienation with 
the status quo of modern American ‘society and its ways’, to employ Hofstadter’s strap-line.  
Poor and lower middle class – especially white - citizens in America’s heartland, hit hard by 
the post-2008 Great Recession, intensely resented how the US had been transformed by 
globalization and dominated by globalist elites, mostly clustered on either coast.  Trump 
presented himself as a conservative, but one who – in foreign policy terms – seized on ‘a 
widespread rejection of globalization and international involvement and…a questioning of 
long-standing postures and policies, ranging from openness to trade and immigrants to a 
willingness to maintain alliances and overseas commitments’ (Haas 2017:  2).  In foreign policy 
terms, Trump’s election was a symptom more than a cause of disillusion with America’s 
habitual support for liberal internationalism. 
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 That is not to say that Trump lacks aspiration to effect radical changes to US foreign 
policy and IR.  On the campaign trail, Trump’s ‘foreign-policy message was crude and often 
strewn with factual errors, but it was unmistakably different’ (Wright 2017: 2627).  Trump 
distanced himself from Republican isolationists by promising ‘kick-ass’ activism that would 
put America first and make it a winner, instead of a compromiser or loser, when its interests 
clashed with those of other states.  But America would become ‘great again’ on the cheap by 
paring back its foreign policy bureaucracy and convincing Mexico to build a wall to keep its 
nationals from immigrating to the US (see Sestanovich 2017).  While Trump’s bluff and bluster 
often left his core foreign policy beliefs less than entirely clear, three nonetheless seemed 
well-established (see Wright 2017: 3230 cf).  
 First, Trump believed that American allies owed vast amounts of money for past and 
present US security guarantees.  In one of his first meetings with a foreign leader – Germany’s 
Angela Merkel – Trump shocked diplomats by claiming that Germany owed the US billions for 
ensuring its security over the course of years.  A few months later, Trump attended a Brussels 
NATO summit at which a memorial to the victims of the 11th September 2001 terrorist attacks 
in the US was unveiled at the alliance’s new headquarters.  At the unveiling ceremony, Trump 
shocked his own advisors by failing to confirm the American commitment to Article 5, which 
holds that an attack on one NATO state is an attack on all.  The only time it had ever been 
invoked was on 9.11. 
 Second, Trump was on record as opposing every trade deal to which the US had signed 
since World War II.  Trump’s campaign promises to – say – abrogate the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or declare China a currency manipulator on his first day in office 
failed to materialize.  But his administration demanded renegotiation of NAFTA with Canada 
and Mexico.  Trump also abandoned the US-China Comprehensive Economic Dialogue 
launched by US President Barack Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao to resolve trade and 
investment disputes.  In early 2018, targeting China, Trump a serious global trade war by 
slapping punitive tariffs on imports of mount foreign-made steel and aluminium on spurious 
national security grounds, even though the US imported very little Chinese steel or aluminium 
(it accounted for around 4 per cent of total steel imports).3  
                                                          
3 See https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21721413-far-saving-jobs-it-will-destroy-
them-protecting-american-steel-imports (accessed 4 March 2018). 
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Third, Trump personalized the political and did little to hide his affinity with authoritarian 
strongmen such as Russia’s Vladimir Putin, China’s Xi Jinping or Egypt’s Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.  
His soft spot for autocrats had foreign policy consequences.  The US President’s admiration 
for the 32 year old Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, appeared a factor in Trump’s 
refusal to certify continued US participation in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the 
multilateral deal to curb Iran’s nuclear programme.  Trump shifted from threatening a pre-
emptive strike in response to North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme to meeting Kim 
Jong-un to discuss denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula and describing him as ‘very 
talented’. 
Of course, Trump’s empathy with authoritarians could cut towards policy continuity 
instead of change.  His visit to China in late 2017, during which he expressed his esteem for 
President Xi in glowing terms saw him, bizarrely, claim that the huge US bilateral trade deficit 
was the fault of his predecessors, not China.  But European leaders needed to get used to 
Trump’s lack of any fellow feeling for them as democratically-elected leaders. 
The case for viewing Trump’s agency in foreign policy as potentially lethal to the liberal 
international order was certainly strong.  Nevertheless, at least two different sources of 
structural constraint imposed discipline on the Trump administration’s foreign policy in its 
first years in office.  The first was the existing network of international organizations.  Trump’s 
sabre-rattling rhetoric about the progression of North Korea’s nuclear capability was 
terrifying.  But, in practice, the US mostly worked via the UN Security Council, as well as (of 
course) bilaterally with China to ramp up sanctions in response to successive tests of North 
Korean ballistic missiles.  North Korea’s Supreme Leader Kim was thus coaxed to the 
negotiating table. 
Within NATO, Trump’s agency reinforced political will in Europe, already coalescing in 
response to Russian aggression, to increase tangibly its military strength and preparedness.  
A month after Trump’s troublesome visit to Brussels, NATO Secretary-General Jens 
Stoltenberg convinced the alliance’s Defence Ministers to develop plans by the end of 2017 
to meet the agreed target of spending 2 per cent of annual GDP on defence.  Non-US NATO 
defence spending increased 4.3 per cent in 2017, with Romania, Latvia and Lithuania set to 
join the existing 5 states – the US, UK, Greece, Estonia and Poland – that already met the 2 
per cent target.  France announced large increases in defence spending foreseen to equal 
9 
 
1.82 per cent of GDP in 2018.4  Even Germany ramped up military spending, although 
gradually and from a low base, since meeting the 2 per cent target would have meant nearly 
doubling its annual military spending.  All told, 25 of 29 NATO member states raised their 
defence spend during Trump’s first year in office.5 
NATO allies also created two new command centres, one focused on maritime operations 
and the other on the logistics of moving forces across the European continent quickly in a 
crisis.  The alliance further agreed to beef up its cyber defences, suggesting a third command 
centre could be in the offing.  Anxious to reaffirm its commitment to NATO after Brexit, the 
UK secured the chairmanship of NATO’s powerful military committee, an important step since 
it was likely to lose its traditional hold on Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe as the 
post held specific duties for NATO-EU cooperation.  A former US Ambassador to NATO, 
Douglas Lute, commended NATO’s reawakening:  ‘Here you have one of the pillars of the 
international order – which as a group these institutions are doubted and criticized today – 
you have one pillar that is looking at itself and taking reasoned, considered, responsible steps 
to adapt’.6    
Where Trump the change agent appeared least constrained was on trade policy.  The 
‘President’s 2017 Trade Policy Agenda’ that the Trump administration sent to Congress (as 
required by statute) blustered that the administration would ‘aggressively defend American 
sovereignty over matters of trade policy’ (USTR 2017: 3).7  The US repeatedly blocked 
appointments to the WTO’s appellate body that ultimately ruled on trade disputes, leading 
the EU Commissioner for Trade to accuse the US administration of ‘killing the WTO from the 
inside’.8  Meanwhile, the NAFTA renegotiations dragged on, with US Trade Representative 
Robert Lighthizer accusing Canada and Mexico in late 2017 of being unwilling ‘seriously to 
engage on provisions that will lead to a rebalanced agreement’.9 
                                                          
4 Expatica (France), 8 November 2017; https://www.expatica.com/fr/news/country-news/France-budget-
defence_1530717.html (this link and all others cited were accessed 1-3 December 2017 except where noted). 
5 See Politico (Europe edition), 28 June 2017; https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-jens-stoltenberg-spending-
increase-non-us-by-4-3-percent-in-2017/. 
7 See also https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/03/01/trump-may-ignore-wto-in-major-
shift-of-u-s-trade-policy/?utm_term=.4da521598c46.   
7 See also https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/03/01/trump-may-ignore-wto-in-major-
shift-of-u-s-trade-policy/?utm_term=.4da521598c46.   
8 Quoted in Financial Times, 10 November 2017; https://www.ft.com/content/5afbd914-a2b2-11e7-8d56-
98a09be71849.   
9 Quoted in https://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanielparishflannery/2017/11/30/have-nafta-talks-reached-a-
breaking-point/#77383900276b.  
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Yet, even on trade, Trump appeared constrained by the practicalities of wider foreign 
policy goals.  His threat to withdraw from the US-South Korea free trade agreement was 
shelved in favour of a renegotiation – which agreed minor changes after only 11 days and 
exempted South Korea from steel tariffs - amidst efforts to handle the North Korea nuclear 
crisis.  On trade as on other foreign policy issues, Trump faced a second set of constraints on 
which foreign policy analysts often focus:  access to and power wielded within US foreign 
policy by multiple institutions and civil society voices.  Trump’s threat of punitive steel tariffs 
was initially resisted by a coalition of US manufacturers who benefitted from access to cheap, 
foreign steel.  It was also staunchly opposed by the EU, which signalled it would hit back with 
$3.5 billion worth of retaliatory sanctions on goods from bourbon to blue jeans to 
motorcycles.10  Modernizing a time-honored tradition in trade wars, Trump took to Twitter to 
ramp up the rhetoric: ‘If the EU wants to further increase their already massive tariffs and 
barriers on US companies doing business there, we will simply apply a Tax on their cars which 
pour freely into the US’.11  
Another check on Trump’s agency was the power of the US Congress in foreign policy.  In 
early 2018, the US Senate effectively froze America’s Russia policy by voting 98-2 to limit 
Trump’s ability to suspend or lift sanctions on Russia.  Congress also placed limits on the 
Trump administration’s attempts to impose swingeing budget cuts on the State Department 
and USAid. 
Yet another force for continuity over change was the professional US foreign policy 
community, an entity John Mearsheimer has labelled ‘the Blob’.12  According to this view, few 
differences exist between Democrat and Republican foreign policy operatives in terms of 
foreign policy outlook, and any differences that do arise result from the seeking of short-term 
political gain.  Add to the mix career foreign policy officials and the consensus in terms of 
foreign policy viewpoint is both extended and reinforced.  Members of ‘the Blob’ tend to be 
conservative and favour continuity over change.  Well into his second year as President, 
                                                          
10 See https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/02/us/politics/trump-tariffs-steel-
aluminum.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=first-column-
region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news (accessed 3 March 2018). 
11 Quoted in https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/03/us/politics/trump-european-cars-tariff-trade.html 
(accessed 4 March 2018). 
12 Here I borrow from Mearsheimer’s contribution to a roundtable on ‘America First vs. the Legitimacy of the 
American International System?’ held 2nd September 2017 at the annual conference of the American Political 
Science Association in San Francisco. 
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Trump had still not made appointments to many key foreign policy positions, leaving in place 
career officials without political appointees above them to ram through change.  For example, 
there was still no Chief of the US Mission to the EU – effectively, no EU Ambassador – as of 
June 2018.  The phenomenon was by no means exclusive to Europe.  With crises roiling the 
‘Northern Triangle’ of Central America – El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras – the US faced 
a migrant surge with no Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs (the top US 
diplomat for the region) or Ambassador to Honduras in place.13  Well into Trump’s second 
year in office, US ambassadorships remained vacant in Egypt, South Korea and Turkey. 
It was debatable whether Trump’s senior foreign policy appointees could be counted as 
members of ‘the Blob’.  But what came to be known as the ‘axis of adults’ – Secretary of 
Defence Jim Mattis, National Security Advisor Herbert McMaster, and Secretary of State Rex 
Tillerson – initially seemed to round the hard edges off Trump’s America First agenda.  To 
illustrate, McMaster co-authored a Wall Street Article with the Head of Trump’s National 
Economic Council, Gary Cohn, that tried to clean up the mess of Trump’s March 2017 NATO 
visit by claiming (falsely) that Trump had ‘reconfirm[ed]…America’s commitment to NATO and 
Article 5’ (McMaster and Cohn 2017).  The article also argued – gamely, if unconvincingly (see 
Summers 2017) – that ‘America first doesn’t mean America alone’, while parroting Trump’s 
conviction that ‘the world is not a global community’ (McMaster and Cohn 2017). 
Yet, by spring 2018, Tillerson, McMaster, and Cohn had all left the administration.  The 
new Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, was an ardent hawk on Iran.  John Bolton – one of the 
most aggressive unilateralists ever to hold a senior US foreign policy position – was Trump’s 
National Security Advisor.  Cohn’s departure elevated the status of hard-line trade advisor 
Peter Navarro, the (co-)author of Death By China (Navarro and Autry 2011), who unleashed a 
shocking attack on Justin Trudeau after a June 2018 Group of Seven summit, bellowing that 
there was ‘a special place in hell’ for Canada’s Prime Minister.14 
In short, an interrogation of the power of agency vs. structure – and multiple sources of 
‘structure’ – yields a mixed picture when applied to Trump’s foreign policy.  But a crucial 
                                                          
13 J. Webber and J.P. Rathbone, ‘US braced for migrant surge as region convulses’, Financial Times, 2 December 
2017.  It also mattered that Trump proposed to cut the State Department’s budget by 31 per cent, Tillerson 
announced cuts of 8 per cent to State’s officer corps and the number of (mostly young) people taking the US 
Foreign Service officer entry test fell by one-third in 2017.  See New York Times, 27 November 2017. 
14 https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-us-canada-44435081/trump-trudeau-special-place-in-hell-for-justin-
trudeau.   
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question at a time when US international leadership seems to be in question is:  can Europe 
help fill the leadership vacuum?  Is Europe up to the job? 
 
3.  Europe:  Time to Shine?  Or Decline? 
The election of Donald Trump presents Europe with an opportunity to assert both its values 
and foreign policy nous in a way much of the world would find welcome.  The EU’s efforts to 
make something of its Common Foreign and Security Policy and Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP) plus deliver on its Trade For All strategy - which promised that EU trade 
policy would ‘dovetail with the EU’s development and broader foreign policies so that they 
mutually reinforce one another’ (Commission 2015: 2) – faced an opportune political 
moment.  With Trump in the White House, EU member governments had strong incentives 
to step up their efforts to preserve multilateralism and ensure the liberal international 
system’s survival. 
 Unfortunately, the moment arrived at (or just after) a time of acute crisis in Europe.  
George Soros (2015: 4) reckoned that the EU faced 5 crises by late 2015:  on migration, the 
euro, Greece, Ukraine and Brexit.  No system of government is very good at solving multiple 
crises at once, let alone one as convoluted as the EU.  If the first 4 crises were at least 
contained (not solved) over the next two years, Brexit certainly was not at time of writing.  It 
consumed EU diplomatic and political time and attention to the point where the Union at 
times seemed to lack the ‘bandwidth’ for anything else.   
 One result was that research on the EU focused on ‘crisis’ became a growth industry 
(see Dinan et al 2017; Peterson 2017: 349).  It was supplemented by works, many by 
journalists, focused on ‘the end of Europe’ (Kirchick 2017) or – linking Europe’s demise with 
the rise of Trump - ‘the end of western liberalism’ (Luce 2017; see also Hewitt 2013; Judis 
2016; Krastev 2017).  The most breathless saw the rise of populism as a cancer that had 
infected western democracies: ‘Europe today is breaking apart; it is increasingly 
undemocratic, economically stagnant, threatened by extremists of all stripes from the illiberal 
left to the authoritarian right, and slowly headed down the once unfathomable path to war’ 
(Kirchick 2017: 95).  Even Thomas Wright of the usually sober Brookings Institution argued 
that ‘Brexit has put the European Union on the brink of a breakup’ (Wright 2017: 640, 644). 
 Amidst the doom and gloom, the EU – leaving aside but also spurred by Brexit – quietly 
took steps that put it as close as it had ever been to actual leadership in IR.  It helped that the 
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shocks of the Great Recession, which hit (especially southern) Europe as hard as any other 
region of the world, finally started to fade.  The EU economy grew by 2.4 per cent, the fastest 
pace in a decade, in 2017.  The recovery gathered steam over the course of the 5 previous 
years, with the EU’s economy out-growing that of the US in 2016-17, and European 
unemployment falling to a 9 year low (Juncker 2017).   
 Moreover, Brexit actually promised to facilitate solidarity on foreign policy, either 
because the UK’s absence removed obstacles to new initiatives or because London looked to 
demonstrate its continued international weight.  Falling into the first category were steps 
towards what EU Commission (2017) President Jean-Claude Juncker termed a ‘European 
Defence Union’.  All but 2 of the remaining 27 EU member states signed up to military 
commitments under Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in late 2017. Crucially, 
PESCO called for all to increase their share of spending on defence research and technology 
to the NATO target of 2 per cent of annual spending.  Perhaps even more important was 
earlier agreement on a European Defence Fund worth more than €5 billion per year:  a 
potentially critical step towards consolidating Europe’s military research and procurement 
efforts (see Biscop 2018).  For the first time, the EU’s CSDP efforts seemed to be driving the 
NATO alliance towards closer cooperation instead of competing with it. 
 Prominent in the second category – where the UK was keen to show its relevance – 
was the Iran nuclear deal.  After Trump pulled the US out, European partners to the 
agreement – France, Germany and the UK – closed ranks, with their Heads of State or 
Government issuing a joint statement signalling strong support for the deal.15  In 
presentational terms, however, it mattered that they left it to the EU’s High Representative 
for foreign policy, Frederica Mogherini, to deliver a strongly-worded rebuke of Trump’s 
decision, which stressed:  ‘[i]t is not a bilateral agreement.  It does not belong to any single 
country.  And it is not up to any country to terminate it’.16 
 More generally, EU foreign policy-makers seemed to connect the political reality of 
drift in the transatlantic alliance with how poorly-coordinated the Union’s foreign policy 
tools often were.  Mogherini (2016) found an opportune moment – even before Trump’s 
election – to unveil an ‘EU Global Strategy’.  ‘Global’ referred not only to geographic reach 
                                                          
15 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/declaration-by-the-heads-of-state-and-government-of-france-
germany-and-the-united-kingdom.   
16 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b9rO1gCxjy8.   
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but also to the range of EU policy instruments, including energy, counterterrorism, 
diplomatic, military and trade policies.  The Strategy raised eyebrows by embracing the idea 
of the EU’s ‘strategic autonomy’.  While it was framed as the ability to respond in a 
coordinated way to threats and crises, many viewed it as a call for European independence 
from the US security umbrella.  The Strategy appeared to pave the way for the EU’s 
subsequent steps towards a European Defence Union, although Trump’s description of 
NATO as ‘obsolete’ reinforced European will to make sure the EU’s push on defence 
cooperation added value in terms of strengthening NATO. 
In short, reports of the EU’s demise seem premature.  That much was clear even 
without knowing the fate of French President Emmauel Macron’s proposals to bolster 
Eurozone cooperation with a common budget and Finance Minister or the consequences of 
the German Social Democratic Party’s push for a ‘refoundation of Europe’ and a common 
European tax policy as the price for supporting Merkel in a new coalition government 
following Germany’s 2017 election.17  What was less clear was the fate of the transatlantic 
alliance, which was showing signs of atrophy even before Trump’s election.   
 
4. The Transatlantic Alliance:  Structurally Sound or History Bound? 
When we assess the current health of US-European relations, another mixed picture emerges.  
As we have seen, the combination of Russia’s adventurism and Trump’s goading spurred 
NATO to ramp up both its operational and military capacity.  Yet, over time the EU itself has 
become the most important locus of transatlantic policy cooperation (see Peterson 2016a).  
On nearly all non-military issues – including financial regulation, cybersecurity or sanctions on 
Russia – the EU is a policy factory.  Even on counterterrorism, organised crime and homeland 
security, it is with the EU – not NATO – that the US engages in transatlantic exchange and 
cooperation (see Rees 2006). 
 Most US-EU cooperation grew out of the Clinton era New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) 
agreed in 1995.  It initially sought to impose high-level political direction on policy 
cooperation, as set out in a lengthy Joint Action Plan (listing some 150 joint actions), with 
twice-annual summits between the US President and cabinet and the EU Commission, 
including its President plus the President of the EU Council of Ministers (see Gardner 1997; 
                                                          
17 T. Buck, ‘Schulz issues tough terms for Merkel alliance’, Financial Times, 2 December 2017.   
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Steffenson 2005).  However, most summits were set-piece affairs with little actual political 
exchange.  They were reduced to once per year in 2000. 
 An evaluative study of the NTA released to coincide with its 20th anniversary found 
that the political profile of the initiative had faded (Peterson et al 2005).  Still, transatlantic 
policy cooperation was intensive and often successful, including on difficult issues such as 
homeland security, competition policy, Afghanistan and Turkey.  So the worker bees 
continued to work away even in times of high political transatlantic turmoil over (say) the Iraq 
War.  In contrast, annual NTA summits deigned to adopt so-called ‘deliverables’ – often on 
micro-issues such trade in small arms or educational exchanges – with US Presidents 
subjected to almost endless speeches and requests for photos from European leaders.  In 
2010, the holder of the rotating EU Council Presidency – Spain – learned from media reports 
that Barack Obama did not plan to attend the NTA Summit they were organising in Madrid 
since he had not found previous summits useful (Wright 2017: 631).  At time of writing, no 
summit under the auspices of the NTA had been held since 2014, with EU leaders meeting the 
US President instead in the margins of NATO summits.   
More generally, the NTA shows how partnership in IR cannot be engineered or 
institutionalized in the absence of common interests (see Peterson and Steffenson 2009).  
Realist IR theorists would no doubt point to transatlantic relations illustrates the edict of Lord 
Palmerson – UK Foreign Secretary for nearly 35 years at the height of British power in the 19th 
century – that there are no such things as permanent alliances, only permanent interests.  
However, to do so would be to neglect how Europe remains Washington’s first port of call on 
security questions and most economic ones.  Regular bilateral exchanges continue in broad 
policy areas such as homeland security (which features twice-annual ministerial meetings) as 
well as on discrete issues such as electronic cars.  The lead official on relations with the US in 
the EU’s European External Action Service – which took on the feel of a genuine foreign 
ministry – termed the NTA ‘a matter of history now.  But lots of dialogues go merrily 
along…things are still ticking over at the working level’.18 
If lines of continuity are visible in transatlantic relations at the working level, we can 
also find them at the political level.  Well before Donald Trump’s election, successive post-
Clinton US administrations publicly expressed disappointment with Europe’s ability to deliver 
                                                          
18 Interview, Brussels, 27 April 2017. 
16 
 
on key US foreign policy priorities.  Even Obama, an instinctive multilateralist, repeatedly 
aired his frustration with both the EU and NATO.  After using the prime political real estate of 
his 2013 State of the Union address to launch negotiations on a Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership, the negotiations ground on inconclusively mostly because of 
European inflexibility (see Peterson 2016b).  By the time Trump arrived and suspended the 
negotiations, European officials admitted that – even if they were re-started – there would 
be ‘2 years at least of negotiations left to get a deal’.19  
In a revealing interview during his final year in office, Obama pointed to the Libya crisis 
in 2011 as a moment of particular US disappointment with Europe (Goldberg 2016).  Europe’s 
gung-ho assertiveness to remove Muammar Qaddafi and prevent a threatened bloodbath in 
Benghazi – Libya’s second-largest city - seemed hypocritical when European militaries ran out 
of serviceable weapons and had to rely on US firepower to complete the NATO-led operation.  
Obama was irked by an anonymous US official’s claim that the US was ‘leading from behind’ 
in Libya: ‘The irony is that it was precisely to prevent the Europeans and Arab states from 
holding our coats while we did all the fighting that we, by design, insisted [they take the lead].  
It was part of the anti-free rider campaign’ (Goldberg 2016).  Asked to elaborate, Obama 
observed that the military operation was executed  
 
as well as I could have expected…And despite all that, Libya is a mess…When I go back 
and ask myself what went wrong, there’s room for criticism, because I had more faith 
in the Europeans, given Libya’s proximity, being invested in the follow-up…[Libya is a 
source of] a massive migration into Europe that destroys Europe, [potentially] ends 
the European project, and everyone runs for cover and you’ve got the 1930s all over 
again, with nationalism and fascism breaking out (Goldberg 2016). 
 
Obama’s remarks suggest, ironically, that the future of US-European relations and the 
liberal international order depend less than we might expect on what the US or Europe do to 
invest in their alliance or in foreign policy more generally.  What really matters is domestic 
democratic politics in Europe and America.  The election of Trump, Brexit and the rise of far 
right parties across Europe can be viewed as part of a single narrative of rising disillusion with 
                                                          
19 Interview, European External Action Service, 27 April 2017. 
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traditional political classes and outcomes in western democracies, as well as globalization 
more generally.  The narrative is sourced partly in contingent factors such as the Great 
Recession, Europe’s migration crisis and media fragmentation.   
In important respects, Europe could be viewed as countering the narrative.  Macron’s 
victory over the far right candidate Marine Le Pen was decisive and Merkel remained German 
Chancellor after French and German elections in 2017.  The EU reacted to Trump’s election 
and Brexit by redoubling its commitment to multilateralism, as shown by its advocacy of the 
Iran nuclear deal or a 2-state solution in the Middle East peace process.20 
Yet, in the first (of 2) round(s) of the French Presidential election, an astonishing 
majority of young, 18-34 year old French voters backed either the far left (30 per cent) or far 
right (21 per cent), while Macron managed only 18 per cent.  Merkel’s centre-right Christian 
Democrat Union (CDU) suffered a humiliating loss of nearly 8 per cent of its 2013 vote share 
in Germany’s 2017 poll, while 1 in 8 German voters opted for the anti-EU, far right Alternative 
für Deutschland (AfD) party.  AfD became the largest opposition party in the German 
Bundestag.  Ominously, it claimed around 362,000 Facebook followers, compared to the 
CDU’s 154,000 (Garton Ash 2017: 4). 
In short, the US and Europe seem to have a reached multiple crossroads at once.  One 
is located in their internal democratic politics, which are in clear need of renewal and fresh 
ideas about the rights and obligations of their democratic citizens.  Another concerns their 
alliance.  NATO and EU-NATO cooperation both show signs of reinvigoration.  But the EU itself 
remains fragile at a time when a US President occupies the White House who backed Brexit 
and repeatedly has expressed disdain for the EU.  Germany’s Foreign Minister, Sigmar Gabriel 
forcefully argued that US ‘withdrawal’ as a guarantor of western values under Trump ‘forces 
us to act…Only if the European Union defines its own interests and projects its own power 
can it survive’.21   
The liberal international order has arrived at a final intersection.  The question is 
whether it can survive rising western nationalism and the rise of emergent powers outside 
the western democratic club simultaneously.  We would probably be wise not to try to predict 
                                                          
20 Both issues featured prominently in Mogherini’s statement at a joint press conference with Tillerson on 5th 
December 2017.  See https://www.politico.eu/article/rex-tillerson-federica-mogherini-visits-brussels-amid-
doubts-about-his-future-and-his-boss/.   
21 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-05/germany-says-trump-s-u-s-withdrawal-means-
europe-must-step-up.   
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which way things will turn on any of these fronts.  But it also seems clear that all are connected 
and that major changes in IR that threaten serious conflict and damage to the international 
order cannot be dismissed out of hand. 
 
Conclusion  
Defenders of the post-war international order might take comfort in the claim of many 
theorists that IR is mostly about ‘recurrence and repetition’ (Wight 1966), and that structure 
trumps agency.  However, such an account discounts the effects of the global power shift 
away from the West as well as historical evidence that such shifts usually have led to conflict 
(Kupchan 2012).  From the perspective of foreign policy analysis and constructivist theory, 
Donald Trump’s agency in pursuing his America First agenda faces a range of constraints, both 
institutional and political.  But his administration’s conviction that ‘the world is not a global 
community’ (McMaster and Cohn 2017), asserted by two of Trump’s more moderate and now 
departed figures, suggests that the liberal international order will somehow need to survive 
the Trump era because there is no short-term prospect for its renewal. 
 Or, maybe, as we have seen, Europe may seize on the rise of Trump – as well as Putin’s 
Russia – to raise its game.  The evidence so far is disparate.  But the Trump era marks both an 
opportunity as well as a challenge to Europe.  It could be that Europe has woken up late to 
American disillusion with its transatlantic alliance that predates Trump. 
By the end of Trump’s first year in power, a range of works had appeared that tried to 
shed light on the forces that made possible his meteoric rise.  King (2017) argued that 
globalisation was a political choice that threatened the demise of democratic ideas and 
institutions.  A leading critic of ‘hyper-globalization’ insisted that the internationalization of 
markets drove a wedge between highly-skilled cosmopolitans who could take advantage of 
them and those ‘left behind’ (Rodrik 2017).  A leading legal scholar and former Obama 
administration official, Cass Sunstein (2017), offered a chilling assessment of the drift towards 
information ‘echo chambers’ in which citizens consumed only information that accorded with 
their own beliefs.   
All of these works might seem a long way removed from debates about agency vs. 
structure in IR.  But they, as well as a lot of empirical evidence from contemporary democratic 
politics, suggest that the fate of the liberal international order begins at home. Western 
political classes need to design policy solutions to the externalities of globalization, including 
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rising inequality, job losses from automation, and surges in migration.  But, perhaps above all, 
they need to develop counter-narratives to America First and other appeals to the worst 
angels of western citizens’ natures.   
 
   
 
REFERENCES 
Alcaro, R., Peterson, J. and Greco, E. (eds) (2016) The West and the Global Power Shift:  
Transatlantic Relations and Global Governance (Basingstoke and New York: 
Palgrave). 
Biscop, S. (2018) ‘European Defence:  Give PESCO a Chance’, Survival, 60 (3): 161-80. 
Carlsnaes, W. (1992) ‘The Agency/Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis’, 
International Studies Quarterly, 36 (3): 245-70. 
Commission (2015) Trade for All:  Towards a More Responsible Trade and Investment 
Strategy. Luxembourg:  European Union; 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/october/tradoc_153846.pdf.   
Commission (2017) ‘President Jean-Claude Juncker’s State of the Union Address 2017’.  
Brussels, 13 September; http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-
3165_en.htm.   
Dinan, D., Nugent, N. and Paterson, W. (2017) (eds) The European Union in Crisis.  
Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave. 
Gardner, A. (1997) A New Era in US-EU Relations?  The Clinton Administration and the New 
Transatlantic Agenda. Aldershot and Brookfield VT: Ashgate. 
Garton Ash, T. (2017) 'It's the Kultur, Stupid', New York Review of Books, 7-20 December: 4-
10. 
Goldberg, J. (2016) ‘The Obama Doctrine’, The Atlantic, April; 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-
doctrine/471525/.   
Haas, R. (2017) A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order. 
New York: Penguin. 
Hay, C. (1995) ‘Structure and Agency’ in D. Marsh and G. Stoker (eds) Theory and Methods 
in Political Science. Basingstoke and New York:  Macmillan. 
20 
 
Hewitt, G. (2013) The Lost Continent. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 
Hofstadter, R. (2008) The Paranoid Style in American Politics. New York: Vintage Books. 
Ikenberry, G.J. (2001) After Victory:  Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of 
Order After Major Wars. Princeton and Oxford:  Princeton University Press. 
Ikenberry, G.J. (2017) ‘The plot against American foreign policy.  Can the liberal order 
survive?’, Foreign Affairs, 46 (2) (May/June): 2-9. 
Judis, J.B. (2016) The Populist Explosion:  How the Great Recession Transformed American 
and European Politics. New York: Columbia Global Reports. 
Keohane, R.O. and Nye Jr., J.S. (2011) Power and Interdependence. Cambridge: Pearson, 4th 
edn. 
King, S.D. (2017) Grave New World: the End of Globalization, the Return of History.  New 
Haven CT and London:  Yale University Press. 
Kirchick, J. (2017) The End of Europe. New Haven CT and London: Yale University Press 
(Kindle edition). 
Krastev, I. (2017) After Europe.  Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Kupchan, C. (2012) No One’s World: the West, the Rising Rest and the Coming Global Turn. 
Oxford and New York:  Oxford University Press. 
Lasswell, H.D. (1950) ‘World Politics and Personal Insecurity’ in H.D. Lasswell and others, A 
Study of Power. Glencoe, IL: the Free Press. 
Luce, E. (2017) The Retreat of Western Liberalism. London: Little Brown. 
McMaster, H.R. and Cohn, G.D. (2017) ‘America First Doesn’t Mean America Alone’, The 
Wall Street Journal, 30 May; https://www.wsj.com/articles/america-first-doesnt-
mean-america-alone-1496187426.   
Moghereni, F. (2016) Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy 
for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy.  Brussels: European External 
Action Service); https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/global-strategy-foreign-and-
security-policy-european-union 
Moravcsik, A. (2003) ‘Liberal International Relations Theory: a Scientific Assessment’ in C. 
Elman and M. Fendius Elman (eds) Progress in International Relations Theory:  
Appraising the Field. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 
Navarro, P. and Autry, G. (2011) Death By China:  Confronting the Dragon – a Global Call to 
Action.  New York:  Prentice-Hall. 
21 
 
Peterson, J. (2016a) ‘All Roads Don’t Lead to Brussels (But Most Do):  European Integration 
and Transatlantic Relations’ in R. Alcaro, J. Peterson and E. Greco (eds) The West and 
the Global Power Shift. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Peterson, J. (2016b) ‘Choosing Europe or Choosing TTIP?  The European Union and the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 
21 (3): 383-402. 
Peterson, J. (2017) ‘Juncker’s Political European Commission and an EU in Crisis’, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 55 (2): 349-67. 
Peterson, J. et al (2005) Review of the Framework for Relations Between the European 
Union and the United States:  an Independent Study. Brussels:  European 
Commission. 
Peterson, J. and Steffenson, R. (2009) ‘Transatlantic Institutions:  Can Partnership be 
“Engineered’?”, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 11 (1): 25-45. 
Rees, W. (2006) Transatlantic Counter-terrorism Cooperation:  the New Imperative.  London 
and New York: Routledge. 
Rengger, N. (2007) ‘Realism, Tragedy and the Anti-Pelagian Imagination in International 
Political Thought’ in M.C. Williams (ed) Realism Reconsidered:  the Legacy of Hans J. 
Morgenthau in International Relations.  Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Rodrik, D. (2017) Straight Talk on Trade: Ideas for a Sane World.  Princeton NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Sestanovich, S. (2017) ‘The Brilliant Incoherence of Trump’s Foreign Policy’, The Atlantic, 
May; https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/05/the-brilliant-
incoherence-of-trumps-foreign-policy/521430/. 
Smith, S., Hadfield, A. and Dunne, T. (2012) Foreign Policy:  Theories, Actors, Cases. Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn. 
Steffenson, R. (2005) Managing EU-US Relations: Actors, Institutions and the New 
Transatlantic Agenda. Manchester and New York:  Manchester University Press. 
22 
 
Summers, L. (2017) ‘Business Needs to Show That There is More to America than Trump’, 
Financial Times, 4 June; https://www.ft.com/content/b4cb6d92-46b9-11e7-8d27-
59b4dd6296b8.  
Sunstein, C. (2017) #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
USTR (2017) The President’s 2017 Trade Policy Agenda. Washington DC:  US Trade 
Representative; 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/reports/2017/AnnualReport/Chapter%20I%
20-%20The%20President%27s%20Trade%20Policy%20Agenda.pdf.   
Waltz, K.N. (1979) Theory of International Politics. New York: Random House. 
Wendt, A. (1992) ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power 
Politics’, International Organization, 46 (2): 391-426. 
Wight, M. (1966) ‘Why is There No International Theory?’ in H. Butterfield and M. Wight 
(eds) Diplomatic Investigations. London:  George Allen and Unwin. 
Wright, T.J. (2017) All Measures Short of War:  the Contest for the 21st Century and the 
Future of American Power. New Haven CT and London: Yale University Press (Kindle 
edition). 
